

National Institutes of Health: Dual-Use Screening Survey

Questions for all biological research registrations and amendments

PI (name): _____
 Institute: _____

For DOHS use: Reg. # or title: _____

Biological research is considered 'dual-use' in nature if the methodologies, materials, or results could be used in some manner to cause public harm. To ensure all NIH research is given due consideration as to whether the work includes 'dual-use research of concern' (DURC), where results may *readily* be used for harmful purposes, these questions are answered in our electronic registration submission process and considered during research review. This form illustrates the questions that are asked and considered during review. Affirmative answers do not necessarily automatically indicate research as DURC, nor will it usually delay experimental progress, it will merely indicate further consideration may be warranted as the research advances, or as research results are published.

<u>Screening Questions</u>	Yes	No	N/A
A. Will the intermediate or final product of your experiments:			
1. enhance the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin? (For example, will it enable weaponization* of an agent or toxin, enhance virulence, or render a non-pathogen virulent?)			
2. disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without clinical or agricultural justification? (For example, make a vaccine less effective)			
3. confer to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies? (For example, confer a drug resistance trait to microorganism(s) in the study that could compromise the use of appropriate or conventional drugs to control or detect these microorganism(s) as disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture)?			
4. increase the stability, transmissibility, or ability to disseminate the agent or toxin?			
5. alter the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin?			
6. enhance the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin?			
7. generate or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin?			
B. Will synthetic biology⁺ techniques be used to construct a pathogen, toxin, or potentially harmful product?			
C. Even if your planned research does not involve <u>any</u> of the aforementioned criteria, and realizing your work or results could conceivably be misused, is there the potential for your data/product to be <u>readily</u> utilized to cause public harm?			

* In this context, weaponization refers to the enhanced dispersion, deliverability, survivability or pathogenesis of an agent or toxin. ⁺Synthetic biology includes, but is not limited to, techniques of molecular biology, chemistry and genetics that would allow for the *de novo* synthesis or reverse engineering of genes, gene products or entire functional organisms.

For any question answered 'yes' please provide additional supplemental information to allow for review of the indicated concern.

After considering the above answers, do you believe there is the potential for your research data/product to be readily utilized to cause public harm? Yes No

PI Signature: _____ Date: _____

Reviewed by DOHS IBC: _____ Date: _____

This questionnaire conforms with the US Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern. Information regarding the dual-use dilemma in biological research may be found at:
<http://www.serceb.org/dualuse.htm>.