# NIH Institutional Biosafety Committee Minutes
# National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
**Thursday, Mar 12, 2026**
**3:30 PM – 4:30 PM**
**Virtual via Teams**

**Members Present:**
Quorum Met: Yes

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| ☒ | Francesco Demayo | Chair |
| ☒ | Christopher McGee | Biosafety Officer |
| ☒ | David Kurtz | Animal Expert |
| ☒ | Robert Petrovich | Protein Expression Expert |
| ☒ | Justin Kosak | Lab Representative |
| ☒ | Shih-Heng Chen | Virology Expert |
| ☒ | Andrew Newell | Toxicology Expert |
| ☒ | Huanchen Wang | Cell & Molecular Expert |
| ☒ | Lawrence Kirschner | Clinical Expert |
| ☒ | Stephen Novak | Ex Officio |
| ☒ | John McLamb | Radiological Expert |
| ☒ | Jacqueline Hamilton | Community Representative |
| ☒ | Troy Weaver | Community Representative |

**Guests Present**:
Althea Treacy, BMB Branch Chief, NIH

**Announcements & Call to Order**
I. Meeting called to order by Francesco Demayo at 3:30pm.
II. The IBC Chair noted no committee conflicts of interest on protocol for review.

**Review of Past IBC Meeting Minutes**
I. Jan 15, 2026, Minutes
   a. The Jan 2026 minutes were unanimously approved pending minor grammatical correction.

**New Committee Business**
I. BSO or IBC lead reviewer preliminary registration approvals since the previous meeting.
   a. None

II. Registrations for Committee review

   a. New registrations for committee review:

      Registration Number, PI: B-1993, Guohong Cui
      i. Reviewers: Justin Kosak
      ii. Review Summary: The PI aims to stably transduce human neuroblastoma cell line SH-SY5Y with Lenti-Cre (3rd gen), Lenti-Flp (3rd gen). The work will be used as a positive control for specific gene function testing and for establishing an in vitro AAV quality control system for AAV use in ongoing mouse experiments previously approved.
      iii. Committee Discussion: The committee discussed identified lentiviral vector, AAV, and human cell line risks and discussed the proposed mitigation strategies. Work with lentiviral vectors minimum PPE includes closed-front gown, double gloves, eye protection. All work is conducted in Class II BSC.

Work with AAV minimum PPE includes gloves, lab coat and safety glasses. Treat all biohazardous waste with 1:10 bleach made fresh at least weekly. Dispose all decontaminated solid waste in an orange biohazard bag and submit it to pick up through EHSA.

iv. Training: Annual bloodborne pathogen, biosafety and laboratory safety training.
v. Animal studies proposed: No. Mouse experiments discussed were previously approved.
vi. The committee discussed and determined there is no dual-use or ePPP potential concerns related to these experiments.
vii. Public comment: Non-affiliated community members expressed concern with work proposed within the biosafety permit. No additional public comment was presented.
viii. Work was approved at BSL-1 for prokaryotic work, BSL-2/3 for lentiviral work, and BSL-2 for work with AAVs and human materials.
ix. Relevant sections of the NIH Guidelines: III-D-3
x. A motion was made and seconded to approve the permit.
xi. The committee unanimously approved as written.
    1. Conflicts of interest: None
    2. Votes for: __13__ Votes against: __0__ Abstained: __0__

Registration Number, PI: B-1994, Stavros Garantziotis

i. Reviewers: David Kurtz
ii. Review Summary: The investigator will intra-nasally inoculate mice genetically susceptible to lung fibrosis with mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) strain A59, a murine coronavirus. Four doses will be administered separated by 10 days each. Mice will be sacrificed 10-30 days after last dose to collect lungs for various lung fibrosis endpoints including histology, lavage, and hydroxyproline assay. They will start with low dose increasing from 1.0x10^2 PFU and increase until achieving the highest dose below adverse clinical symptoms up to 1.0x10^6 PFU.
iii. Committee Discussion: The committee discussed MHV A59 as a mouse specific strain of coronavirus which is highly infectious towards mice but not humans. Work described will be done in the conventional animal facility (CAF) which is separated from the traditional animal colonies and allows limited animals and experiments further limiting potential spread between any animals. Previous MHV studies done in the CAF were discussed and biocontainment was determined to be sufficient. The committee discussed the low feasibility of infection of immunocompromised individuals given the strain that has been widespread in the environment for a long time with no evidence of infection. Mitigation strategies discussed included minimum PPE including, gloves, lab coat, safety glasses and mask for any work done outside of the BSC. All work with MHV will be performed in a class II BSC. Any spills should be treated with 1:10 bleach made fresh at least weekly. Dispose all disinfected solid biohazard waste in an orange biohazard bag and submitted for pick up through EHSA.
iv. Training: Annual biosafety and laboratory safety training.
v. Animal studies proposed: Yes, mice
vi. The committee discussed and determined there is no dual-use or ePPP potential concerns related to these experiments.
vii. Public comment: Non-affiliated community members expressed no concern with work proposed within the biosafety permit.
viii. Work was approved as written at BSL-2 and ABSL-2.

ix. Relevant sections of the NIH Guidelines: N/A pathogen only
x. A motion was made and seconded to approve of the permit.
xi. The committee unanimously approved as written.
    1. Conflicts of interest: None
    2. Votes for: __13__ Votes against: __0__ Abstained: __0__

Registration Number, PI: B-1995, Julieta Lischinsky

i. Reviewers: Andrew Newell
ii. Review Summary: The PI aims to start brain slice electro-physiology experiments in a new lab space. To eliminate action potentials allowing recording free from neuronal activity they will perfuse tissue in artificial cerebrospinal fluid (ACSF) with sodium channel blocker tetrodotoxin (TTX, 1uM, 319ng/mL). Recording will be conducted on elctro-physiology rig. [Note, LD50 mice, oral=334ug/kg, IV=8ug/kg].
iii. Committee Discussion: The committee discussed the electrophysiological experimental design proposed and the use of tetrodotoxin (TTX) to eliminate action potentials. It was discussed that LD50 of tetrodotoxin may likely be lower in humans than mice based on reported potential lethal amounts of 1-2mg in human adults. The low working concentration of 1uM was determined to be significantly lower risk. The amount of stock agent on hand will be 1-2mg well below the permissible amount threshold requiring registration with the federal select agent program. NIH policies for working with select toxins within permissible amounts will be followed. Work with stock agents and solutions is to be conducted in a chemical fume hood with minimum PPE including gloves, lab coat, and safety glasses. TTX solutions and waste materials should be treated for 30 minutes with freshly prepared 1:10 bleach and disposed of in biohazard containers for SEPB pickup.
iv. Training: Annual biosafety and laboratory safety training.
v. Animal studies proposed: No
vi. The committee discussed and determined there is no dual-use or ePPP potential concerns related to these experiments.
vii. Public comment: Non-affiliated community members expressed no concern with work proposed within the biosafety permit.
viii. Work was approved as written at BSL-2.
ix. Relevant sections of the NIH Guidelines: N/A. Permissible amount of select toxin.
x. A motion was made and seconded to approve of the permit.
xi. The committee unanimously approved as written.
    1. Conflicts of interest: None.
    2. Votes for: __13__ Votes against: __0__ Abstained: __0__

Registration Number, PI: B-1996, Elizabeta Gjoneska

i. Reviewers: Franco DeMayo
ii. Review Summary: The PI aims to investigate experimental outcomes of human derived iTF microglia cell exposures to herpes viruses (HSV type-1, 3, 4, and 5). Alzheimer's disease associated risk variants will be generated in noncoding and some coding regions in human iTF iPSC-derived microglia. CRISPR/Cas9 will be used to mutate susceptibility locus. The viral vector core will conduct pathogen propagation and cell infections, which may contain viral particles upon receipt by the PI. The PI will conduct several downstream analyses depending on need including, viral replication quantification, gene expression

analysis, fixed cell immunostaining, protein expression analysis, cell migration assays, phagocytosis assays, and fluorescent-activated cell sorting.

iii. Committee Discussion: The community discussed the strains acquisition and use by the VVC and other studies. The necessity of fresh bleach as an appropriate disinfectant was discussed. Risk mitigation was discussed. The minimum PPE requirements include gloves, lab coat and safety glasses. Work generating aerosols to be conducted in class II BSC. Any spills should be treated with 1:10 bleach made fresh at least weekly. Dispose all disinfected solid biohazard waste in an orange biohazard bag and submitted for pick up through EHSA.

iv. Training: Annual bloodborne pathogen, biosafety and laboratory safety training.

v. Animal studies proposed: No

vi. The committee discussed and determined there is no dual-use or ePPP potential concerns related to these experiments.

vii. Public comment: Non-affiliated community members expressed no concern with work proposed within the biosafety permit.

viii. Work was approved as written at BSL-2.

ix. Relevant sections of the NIH Guidelines: III-E

x. A motion was made and seconded to approve of the permit as written.

xi. The committee unanimously approved as written.

1. Conflicts of interest: None.
2. Votes for: __13__ Votes against: __0__ Abstained: __0__

I. Committee Review of Inactivation Procedures
   a. None

II. Standard Operating Procedures/Plans
   a. None

III. Serious Adverse Events in Clinical Trials reviewed by the Committee
   a. None

**Reports**

I. Biosafety Officer Report –
   a. Reported no incidents involving related to permitted work.

**Around the Room/Committee Discussion**

I. Briefed IBC on new member review template to be displayed to member review.

II. SEPB and Biorisk Management provided preliminary updates on likely mandatory shipping training for all workers who conduct biological work. The training will cover requirements for lawfully importing biological materials. Infectious agents must go through courier. All non-infectious hand carry must receive authorization from NIH Quarantine Permit Service Office, declared for customs review, and documentation of non-infectious status must be available. More details will be shared when training is finalized. This training will be in addition to biological material shipping training required for those who conduct packaging and shipping of those materials.

III. The committee had no additional input on preliminary SARS-CoV-2 guidance document.

**Adjournment**

I. Meeting adjourned by Francesco Demayo at 4:17 pm

**Next Meeting**

I. April 16th, 2026, virtual via Teams